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A question often posed in theoretical discussions is whether 
or not one person can make a difference in the ebb and flow 
of history. We might all agree that if that one person were 
a President of the United states, a difference could be made; 
but how much? While the presidency is the single most powerful 
position in the U.s. federal system of government, making it 
a formidable force in world affairs also, most scholars agree 
that the presidency, itself, is very limited, structurally. 
The success of a president in setting the nation along a desired 
course rests with the ingredients brought to the position by 
the person elected to it. Further, many events occur outside 
the control of the president. Fortune or failure depends upon 
how the individual in office reacts to these variables. The 
truest test of presidential skills come when a president is 
caught in a maelstrom of historic episodes. In essence, this 
is the subject of this paper. 
Specifically, I propose to study the policy setting powers 
of President Kennedy and the differences that his abilities 
could have made to history had he not been assassinated. 
President Kennedy governed in a time that was crucial to our 
nation's progression, and he was cut down before he could fully 
leave his imprint upon our country's heritage. This project 
deals with the power of presidents in setting national policy 
by analyzing the potential alternate reality that this man 
could have set forth had the course of human events allowed. 
In this, I shall focus on Kennedy's personal power in setting 
national policy and the probable approach that he would have 
taken to events that engulfed his successors. In the end, I 
hope to solidify the argument that one person can make a 
difference though the disparity between our history and the 
potential reality set forth in this project. 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
The power of the President of the United States to influence 
events around him has rapidly evolved in the last century-­
especially since Franklin Roosevelt inhabited the White House. 
Today, much as it always has, a president's power "is the product 
of his vantage points in government, together with his reputation 
in the Washington community and his prestige outside" (Neustadt 
131). The vantage points to which Richard Neustadt referred 
to in his excellent book, Presidential Power, have grown 
considerably in the last half of a century with the massive 
growth of governmental bureaucracy since Franklin Roosevelt 
took office in 1932. This has proven to be both a positive 
and a negative for White House occupants in their attempts to 
exercise executive control of national policy. 
The presidency is an institution that shares power with 
other forces in creating and implementing a national agenda. 
Presidential power "exists only as a potential. Leadership 
is the means by which the president can exploit that potential" 
(Shogan 5). Structurally, the president must contend with 
Congress to achieve policies through legislation and ratification 
of foreign policies, though Congress has strongly deferred this 
latter power to the President since World War II. But 
even with that concession, "great successes in u.s. foreign 
policy tend to corne in those areas in which there is a consensus 
and thus a continuity in policy" (Ambrose 123). Further, the 
press often serves as "the fourth branch of government", and 
much can be achieved through their cooperation (Neustadt 26). 
The President's cause becomes to persuade all of these differing 
people that the President's cause should be their own (Neustadt 
27). Of this constant political burden, British journalist 
Godfrey Hodgson said: 
Never has anyone office had so much power as the president 
of the United states possesses. Never has so powerful 
a leader been so impotent to do what he wants to do, and 
what he is pledged to do, what he is expected to do, and 
what he knows he must do (Shogan 5). 
However, even with these limitations, the President remains 
the pivotal power broker in the nation. With the President's 
powers of veto, appointments, access to the media, budgeting, 
commander-in-chief, and head of the nation's bureaucratic 
machine, to name just a few, a President commands the most 
impressive array of persuasive vantage points in the American 
system (Neustadt). Through this potential for persuasion also 
comes the power of bargaining with the many elements that share 
power with the President, thus allowing him the capability of 
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controlling the tempest of politics in his favor for specific 
agenda goals. In setting this agenda, there are still many 
other factors that influence the success of a chief executive. 
A President's image in Washington, D.C. often will determine 
whether or not he can achieve the results he deems necessary, 
but that image is a constantly fluctuating market in Washington 
where other power brokers can position themselves for or against 
the White House successfully, depending upon how the market 
favors the President. In this, lies a very simple axiom: "The 
men he would persuade must be convinced in their own minds that 
he has skill and will enough to use his advantages" (Neustadt 
44). Neustadt further goes to say that the "greatest danger 
to a President's potential influence is not the show of 
incapacity he shows today, but its apparent kinship ..• to 
form a pattern. " This would undermine confidence in the chief 
executive, and it would stymie his policy setting potential. 
Similarly, much of the same concept relates-to people 
outside of Washington, D.C. The average citizen is much more 
insulated from the market value of Presidential influence than 
political insiders. But when the people do become affected 
by it, the result can be staggering. When people feel their 
everyday lives touched directly by the machinations of the 
president, true power can be irrevocably wielded or lost. The 
abilities that each person brings to this challenge are the 
determinants of success. 
In his book, The Riddle of Power, Robert Shogan outlines 
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three major ingredients to evaluating Presidential power: the 
ideology, the values, and the character of the person in the 
Oval Office. Much like a recipe, an amiable mix of these 
components is necessary to success in White House. The ideology 
of a President provides a "broad philosophical framework for 
deciding which policy goals matter most,. a strategy that 
allows him to achieve these goals" (Shogan 6). Values provide 
the moral epicenter for the President, and they are much more 
deeply rooted in the foundation of the person than is the 
ideology. Shogan says that the values are responsible for the 
personal conduct of the President. "Character is the catalyst 
that melds a president's ideology and values into his vision 
for the country, which is the expression of his leaership" 
(Shogan 7). They are the person's "temperament" and 
"inclinations" when in office (Shogan 7). The formation of 
these elements to form the Presidential puzzle are integral 
to the success of the President. If facing a crucial test, 
a serious weakness in any of these areas can break both the 
Presidency and the man holding it. 
JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE ERA 
In order to visualize the potential impact that President 
"",,,e 
Kennedy could~left upon history, we must first look at the era 
during and after which he was President. The 1960's were much 
perceived to be a time of renewal and change. Kennedy was a 
symbol of this, himself, because he was such a contrast to his 
predecessor, President Eisenhower, both in age and leadership 
style, as he ushered in the new decade. 
President Kennedy, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, 
Profiles in Courage, adequately described a major issue of the 
time as the "seemingly unending war to which we have given the 
curious epithet 'cold' • •. " The complex global contest between 
the Communist Soviet Union and the United States directly, or 
peripherally, dominated almost all aspects of the United States' 
foreign policy. Most significant amongst the era's foreign 
policy commitments were: circumventing Cuba as a threat to 
national security through the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 
1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, protecting Western 
Europe from Soviet aggression during the building of the Berlin 
wall, checking Communist influence in Southeast Asian countries 
such as Laos, Indonesia, and, most notably, Vietnam, and 
balancing a determined military posture with the threat of 
nuclear war in the high stakes poker game played between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. The debilitating effect of the 
Vietnam conflict upon the American prestige and psyche was 
decisively the most disastrous setback for U.S. foreign policy 
in the 20th Century, and its scars deeply rooted in a whole 
generation. 
On the domestic side, the U.S. was a growing powder keg 
of tensions that eventually wreaked havoc within the social 
and political mainstream. Civil Rights, which was an important 
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issue at home for the Kennedy administation, led to landmark 
legislation in 1964 and 1965. The "war" on poverty was a further 
outgrowth of the Kennedy tenure that became the bulwark of the 
Johnson era that proceeded it. Finally, bitter public dissent 
over the nation's involvement in Vietnam coupled with general 
anger and disillusionment over the assassinations of President 
Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy literally 
tore apart the fabric of national order. So vehement was this 
discord, that nearly all of the achievements of the Johnson 
administration were overshadowed and the President was engulfed 
in a sea of discontent that prompted him not to seek re-election. 
JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MAN 
In order to further discern the differences that Kennedy 
might have made, we must determine what kind of power skills 
JFK brought to the Oval Office and how he commanded them. In 
his approach to the political scene, Kennedy described himself 
as an "idealist without illusions" (Harper 12). Robert Shogan 
sets forth the premise that President Kennedy analyzed issues 
in three ways: 
The first was the definition of an issue in terms that 
the public readily understood. Second was the establishment 
of realistic goals, taking into account the position of 
his adversaries. And finally, the commitment to 
presidential prestige and popularity to the struggle to 
attain these goals (Shogan 80). 
Though a romantic and idealist at heart, President Kennedy 
disdained emotional responses or overreactions. Often, in the 
heat of crisis that each president inevitably faces, such 
responses are inadvertantly unveiled. "In all such situations 
it appears that Kennedy was cool, collected, courteous, and 
terse. This does not mean that he was unemotional .••But he 
had schooled his temperament" (Neustadt 155). 
This Kennedy is much different from the pop culture 
mainstream that has today bestowed near legendary status upon 
him. Though his eloquent rhetoric was an instrument that 
inspired an entire nation and caught the eye of the world, his 
exercise of power was far more suited to rationalism than 
idealism. Kennedy operated his White House though a consistent 
pattern: the convening of a command post for critical evaluation 
of the situation at hand, hard .questioning and conception of 
all possible options, maintenance of strict silence, and a 
decision made by the President alone (Neustadt 152). He was 
determined never to react overzealously to any given situation 
even if he had the power to do so. Many claimed that his 
cautious approach towards the exercise of his powers was a 
betrayal of the bold, decisive figure he portrayed during his 
campaign for office. 
Indeed, as President Kennedy learned to "master the machine" 
(Neustadt 151), he became more confident and understood how 
to adapt in order avoid repeating mistakes. Kennedy viewed 
"the conservative outlook of the Congress and his slender 
election victory in 1960" (Harper 17) as serious constraints 
upon substantive opportunities for domestic achievements. In 
contrast, he "ran foreign policy almost without reference to 
Congress" (Ambrose 125). Nonetheless, by his third year, many 
felt that he had undergone "a transformation from a hesitant 
leader with unsure goals to a strong figure with deeply appealing 
objectives" (Harper 14). Further, his hard lesson learned in 
the Bay of Pigs may have enabled him to muster the determination 
necessary during the Cuban Missile crisis, and the lessons of 
that victory may have paved the way towards his highly recognized 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union. 
Wary of pressing too hard in his early years, he commented 
that "Great innovations should not be forced on slender 
majorities" (Harper 12). In his memorable work, A Thousand 
Days, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. noted that President Kennedy 
looked forward to a second term in that it "would give .the 
congressional margin and the popular mandate the first had 
lacked. He saw his second administration•••as the time of 
great legislative action." It would be fair to say that 
Kennedy's approach in his first two years could have been 
cautious to an extreme and definitely enough to anger many-­
especially those involved in civil rights. Regardless, "the 
distinctive quality of Kennedy's leadership--the interplay of 
the self-discipline that marked his character, the rationality 
that reflected his values, and finally, his ability to adjust 
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his ideology" were the central skills that John F. Kennedy 
brought to the Oval Office (Shogan 99). He, himself, offered 
this reflection upon power at Amherst College in 1963: 
The men who create power create an indispensable 
contribution to the nations greatness, but the men who 
question power•••determine whether we use power or power 
uses us. 
This simple statement is powerfully symbolic of the reflective, 
rational approach towards power that Kennedy exhibited in his 
time in office. 
JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MISSED CHALLENGES 
Given that President Kennedy planned to run for re-election, 
many pivotal challenges awaited him had he not been assassinated. 
Most significant amongst the issues Kennedy would have faced 
were his pending bills dealing with civil rights and tax 
reduction, implementing a still formulating strategy to combat 
poverty, re-election, more widespread installment of his New 
Economics, and what would have been, as Robert Shogan called 
it, "the acid test of Kennedy's ability to lead"--Vietnam. 
To speculate on much more would be haphazard in that how JFK 
would have dealt with these issues could have spurred challenges 
incalculable to us today. However, concerning this particular 
range of items, I believe that it is possible to lay a framework 
for Kennedy's lost presidency. 
I I 
In the area of civil rights, I propose that President 
Kennedy would have successfully followed through on a 
comprehensive agenda, though possibly at a slower rate than 
President Lyndon Johnson did in our reality. That JFK was an 
ardent supporter of civil rights was never a question. What 
can reasonably be said about his approach to this issue was 
that President Kennedy saw civil rights within the context of 
the broad political landscape. Kennedy's approach was consistent 
with his standard method: 
First...he established clear goals. In the case of civil 
rights, it was nothing less than the use of federal power 
to strike down legal defenses of segregation. . .Then he 
defined the problem, using the most forceful language ever 
heard from an American president on the subject of race • 
. •Finally, Kennedy used his prestige to mobilize public 
support and the backing of other national leaders ..• 
(Shogan 98). 
Kennedy was careful not to push too hard with his civil rights 
agenda in fear that he would alienate his Southern support for 
other issues and re-election (Brauer 316-17). Finally, the 
racial equality movement "overwhelmed him" and "forced him to 
amend" his political approach (Harper 225). Comprehensive civil 
rights legislation was finally introduced to Congress in February 
of 1963 by the President as the culmination of his methodical 
path towards racial equality. 
While this legislation came to be known as the historic 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed by President Johnson and his 
political machinations, it is likely that President Kennedy 
would have accomplished the same feat. His commitment to 
its passage was firm. Kennedy commented that his "political 
fortunes were riding on the legislation" (Brauer 273). Richard 
Neustadt came to the conclusion that JFK "came to see the risks 
of social alienation as plainly as he saw the risks of nuclear 
escalation." Kennedy insider, Schlesinger concurred by 
emphasizing that by the time of his assassination, his commitment 
to civil rights was as vehement as that for peace. Even "those 
closest to the legislative process" later believed that Kennedy 
would have pushed the civil rights bill through (Brauer 310). 
As a matter of fact, Senate Minority Leader, Everett Dirksen 
claimed that "its time had come", and Carl Albert said that 
"it would have been adopted in essentially the same form whether 
Kennedy lived or died" (Schlesinger 1030). 
In the area of civil rights, it is likely that an extended 
Kennedy administration would have gone down in history, albeit 
kicking and dragging along the way, as possibly the most 
comprehensive advocate of racial equality since Abraham Lincoln. 
Through language expressed before the introduction of the civil 
rights bill, indications are that a Kennedy administration would 
have likewise followed up with something comparable to Johnson's 
voting Rights Act of 1965 (Brauer, Schlesinger). Further, as 
it was, the Kennedy administration set unprecedented standards 
in minority appointments and executive action, specifically 
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through the fierce administration of discrimination prosecutions 
under Attorney General Robert Kennedy. There is no reason to 
assume that the Attorney General would not have been retained 
for a second term in order to reinforce and broaden the efforts 
made in the area of civil rights. Similarly, it is likely that 
with victories in the legislature and a possible re-election, 
JFK would possibly have opened the door a bit more for minority 
appointments. With a greater margin of victory and more 
congressional allies, Kennedy would have become the full fledged 
usher, instead of the martyr, of what Carl Brauer called the 
"Second Reconstruction." 
In the less glamorous, but all important, area of economic 
policy, the Kennedy administration was implementing a concept 
that was dubbed "New Economics" (Harper). This "pro-Keynesian" 
approach for government called for a "policy (that) would now 
be devoting to curing the ills" of the nation in a proactive 
fashion (Harper 183 & 195). This new form of economic stimulus 
called for spurring the economy through its expansion and through 
tax relief and tax reform. In theory, this government action 
would increase prosperity. Kennedy, himself, was not fully 
convinced of the theories of the New Economists until "mid 1962" 
(Harper 195). By this time, JFK, as in his approach to civil 
rights, had become more independent and willing to take such 
risks. What ensued was the beginning of the Revenue Act of 
1964. 
In 1963, President Kennedy introduced legislation that 
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eventually passed in 1964 under Lyndon Johnson that was called 
the Revenue Act of 1964. I propose that President Kennedy had 
already made the effective sale of the legislation before his 
death, and with the opportunity, the possible result could have 
been greater economic growth in the 1960's. As shown by Herb 
Gebelein, the 1960's did show moderate growth (Harper 187-91). 
Heavy expenditures on the Vietnam effort in the Johnson 
era retarded the growth of the economy and undermined the tax 
cut forwarded by the Kennedy administration by increasing 
inflation (Harper 186). Though the economic success under 
Johnson was praised, Phillip M. Simpson argues that "Kennedy 
would have at least rivaled Johnson's record" (Harper 204). 
In all fairness, economics is a dangerous tiger to ride, 
and to say that Kennedy would definitely have bettered Johnson 
in economic policies is folly. What is definite is that 
President Kennedy believed his economic agenda to be his most 
important domestic issue, affecting all others--including civil 
rights, and he would have vigorously pursued a most assured 
victory of his legislation had he lived (Harper & Schlesinger). 
Likely, he would have continued this policy in a consistent 
manner throughout his presidency. However, because of his 
absence, the concept was allowed to "idle" (Harper 180). 
Further, akin as it was to Reaganomics, "there has been growing 
doubt about whether such a project can be sustained" (Harper 
180). Ronald King calls Kennedy's economic policies "a beacon 
of inspired if aborted achievement", and this achievement would 
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have been on a course to continue (Harper 180). 
As for the matter of re-election, I feel it safe to say 
that President Kennedy had little to worry about. As Schlesinger 
noted, "He had little doubt. •. that he would win the election 
with ease, especially against (Senator Barry) Goldwater." With 
probable victories in civil rights and a popular tax cut included 
in the Revenue Act added to his maturation in foreign policy 
(Cuban missile crisis and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), Kennedy 
would have had many arms to bear against the right wing 
extremist, Goldwater. I doubt, however, that President Kennedy 
would have won by the sweeping margin that Johnson did in 
reality. Though Kennedy skillfully avoided alienating the South 
wing of his party with civil rights, he would have lost some 
to the conservative Goldwater that Johnson, because of his 
Southern heritage, did not. Also, LBJ masterfully played 
Kennedy's death on the political stage as to get all he could 
out of it. Of course, JFK would not have had such raw emotion 
on his side. In the end, however, Kennedy likely would have 
won handily and received the mandate and congressional support 
he needed to begin his "term of legislative action" (Schlesinger 
1016). From that platform, Kennedy was to launch his poverty 
programs and Medicare proposals that had been formulated for 
1964 (Schlesinger 1010-14), but which, instead became the pillars 
of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. 
No doubt, the most asked question concerning a theoretical 
second term of John F. Kennedy is "Would he have gotten out 
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of Vietnam?" Though this is by no means an easy question to 
answer, given the approach President Kennedy appeared to display 
in dealing with such matters, I believe that American involvement 
in Vietnam would have been reduced and, eventually, would 
have ended during a second Kennedy term. The fact that President 
Kennedy was committed to keeping Communism out of Southeast 
Asia was indisputable. Much effort had been made to prevent 
Communism from rising to power in neighboring Laos (Schlesinger 
320-42). As a matter of fact, Vietnam was not even a foreign 
policy priority until the end of his time in office (Rust). 
Most likely, President Kennedy would not have made any firm 
decisions on Vietnam until after the 1964 election, as did 
Johnson, in order to stave a falling out as a result of any 
bold action (Rust 181). 
Following his probable re-election, Kennedy was to face 
no tougher decision than to decide upon the escalation or de­
escalation of u.S. troops and aid to Viet~am. Under his tenure, 
he had already increased personnel from 2,000 to 16,000 in his 
efforts to support the South Vietnamese government. The 
assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, the head of the South Vietnamese 
government, only three weeks before his own death, disturbed 
Kennedy more than anything since the Bay of Pigs (Schlesinger 
997). In November of 1963, the President asked his aide for 
the Far East, Michael Forrestal, to prepare a study on 
Vietnam options which would include the option of withdrawal. 
Shogan, at this point says that "he believed that the U.S. had 
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a commitment to that country, but he was determined to keep 
that commitment limited." Like under Johnson, I believe that 
JFK would have put off firm commitment until it was no longer 
possible. 
In the Summer of 1964, in response to aggression by 
Communists, President Johnson pressed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution through Congress, giving the President a wide range 
of deferred military options. "Many congressmen later claimed 
they had been tricked" into voting for this measure (Ambrose 
126). It would have been highly unlikely that Kennedy would 
have approved of such a rash response to to the incident in 
the Gulf. It would have been very uncharacteristic of his 
rational, unemotional approach to such matters. Later, in 1965, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara, the same men who served Kennedy, confronted President 
Johnson with the prospect that a decision had to be made about 
Vietnam. It is very possible that the same recommendation, 
around the same time frame would have been made to Kennedy if 
he were around. 
By this time, it had become apparent that U.S. policy in 
Vietnam was not working and that between major escalation or 
withdrawal, a path had to be chosen. Here, I believe that 
President Kennedy would have decided not to escalate American 
involvement. As Richard Neustadt suggests: 
Given his age, experience, and temperament, .given 
the advantages in our domestic politics accorded to a man 
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who had faced down Khruschev.••1 think he would have 
kept his bombers and his combat troops away. 
Similarly, William Rust states in his book, Kennedy in Vietnam, 
that he "would not have crossed the covert action-advisory 
threshold, would not have bombed North Vietnam, and would not 
have committed u.S. ground troops to South Vietnam." Finally, 
as Robert Shogan points out: 
For Kennedy not to have withdrawn these men, once he became 
convinced that continued u.S. support for Vietnam would 
mean an open-ended commitment for more troops, would have 
fundamentally contradicted the rational approach to ideology 
he had developed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Though we shall never be granted the opportunity to fully 
know what actions John F. Kennedy might have taken after November 
22, 1963, I have tried to set forth some plausible hypotheses. 
In doing so, I have attempted to illuminate the powers of the 
presidency and the differences that one person can make in their 
approach to it through the example of President Kennedy. Through 
this example, I believe that one can definitely discern that 
substantial historical differences would have been made. 
In the event that President Kennedy had lived, along with 
the information provided here, I submit that the ensuing 
alternate reality would bear little resemblance to the one we 
to.
 
know today. First, with JFK alive and re-elected, Lyndon Johnson 
would not have become President of the United States. Johnson 
had begun to fade into the shadows and contemplate retirement 
before JFK's death. Further, Kennedy, not Johnson, would be 
remembered for landmark legislation in domestic issues, though 
it is doubtful that Kennedy could, or would, have produced 
anywhere near the massive legislative agenda that Lyndon Johnson 
did in our reality. On the flip side, however, with Kennedy 
not committing the nation to the Vietnam conflict, the 
legislative achievements would not have been drowned out as 
were Johnson's. Chances are, though, that Kennedy's prestige 
would have been slightly tarnished for losing Southeast Asia 
to the Communists--as was Truman's for "losing" China. However, 
time would likely have cleared that up. Following the chain 
of events as best possible, many other differences become 
apparent. 
Without a Vietnam to embroil and divide the nation, one 
cannot help but believe that, despite unforseeable other factors, 
the nation would not have been as bitter a place come the end 
of President Kennedy's second term. Without a Johnson and 
Vietnam to run against, Robert Kennedy would not have been likely 
to run for President in 1968, nor would he have been killed 
after the California primary. Such assurances cannot concretely 
be made for Martin Luther King, Jr., however. With both 
Kennedys alive and out of the running, I would suggest that 
Hubert H. Humphrey would still have made a run in 1968 and would 
have won. William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman in their 
book, On His Own: Robert F. Kennedy, stated that with 
RFK alive (despite popular opinion, Kennedy probably would not 
have won the nomination) Humphrey should have beaten Nixon. 
So, without Vietnam, the RFK assassination, the Chicago riots, 
and with a live, two term President, I ,too, believe that the 
Democrats would have won in 1968. Beyond that, not much can 
be certain. I am sure, obviously, that without Nixon's election 
in 1968, that there would have been no Watergate. Without 
Watergate, there would not have been a President Ford, and 
likely, there would not have been a peanut farmer from Georgia 
to slide in on the wave of distrust of government. We would 
have probably, in my opinion, seen the nominations of Robert 
Kennedy and Ronald Reagan somewhere in time due to their unique 
statures, but whether they would have squared off against each 
or ever succeeded is impossible to conjecture. 
In the end, I have tried to show a world where one man, 
serving at a crucial time in history, could seriously alter 
the course of events as we know them. Further, I have given 
examples of how the use of Presidential power can effectively 
serve as the means for that end. The office and its power 
is aptly described in Robert Shogan's words: 
The president bestrides our political world like a 
contemporary Caesar, reaching into the nooks and crannies 
of our everyday existence. He can lead us into war, or 
economic ruin, or set us against each other. Or he can 
~I 
help us resolve our differences and generate fresh 
confidence and hope. 
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